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IMPERATIVE CHANGE AND OBLIGATION TO DO 
 
Berislav Žarnić 
 
 
The aim of this paper is to provide a solution for the problem (quoted below) 
posed by von Wright. Let ‘(A/B)’ stand for1 ‘a change from initial state A to 
resulting state B occurs (will occur)’ How is it possible that it is obligatory that 
an agent performs an action that makes (¬A/A) come true while it is forbidden 
that s/he performs an action that makes (A/A) true?  
Let “p” stand for “the window is closed”. This state can result from two different 
actions of a given agent. One is the act of closing the window if it is open. The 
other is the act of preventing the window from opening should that happen if the 
agent stays passive. The first action produces a state which is not there. The 
second prevents a state which is there from vanishing. 
The two actions may have different “deontic status”. For example: closing the 
window, if open, may be obligatory, but preventing it from being open, should it 
be closed, may in fact be forbidden. 
(von Wright, 1999, p. 18) 
We will try to approach the problem following the idea that imperative logic 
has a natural connection with deontic logic. Intuitively, by uttering an 
imperative the “imperator” makes an action obligatory or forbidden for the 
addressee.  
The plan of the paper is as follows. First, we will try to find a solution using 
Lemmon's (1965) system of change logic connecting logic of orders being in 
force and deontic logic. Second, we will analyze Aqvist's (1965) approach to the 
problem of connecting imperative and deontic logic. Third, commanded 
change/prescribed actions approach to the semantics of imperatives (Lemmon, 
1965, Segerberg, 1990, 1996) will be restricted to the natural language 
imperatives and Aqvist's way of connecting imperative and deontic logic will be 
modified accordingly. Fourth, a simple "global" semantics for deontic 
“agentives” will be developed using the notion of "opposite action". Finally, a 
solution for von Wright's problem will be given. In the closing sections some 
further topics for investigation will be touched on: one of them being the 
connection between Aqvist's epistemic imperative conception of interrogatives 
                                                 
1 In the text ‘(A/B)’ will always be used as the notation for change expression. Consequently, 
‘Ought(A/B)’ will not stand for conditional obligation ‘A is obligatory under condition B’, 
instead, it will stand for ‘it is obligatory that A changes to B’. 
and "epistemic obligations", the other being formalization of the idea that 
imperatives create and re-create obligation patterns that can be described in 
deontic terms. 
Connection: imperative and deontic logic 
There is a widespread conjecture that imperative logic and deontic logic are 
somehow connected. According to Alf Ross (1941), “linguistically indicative 
sentences of «duty» and «rightness» with regard to action” should be counted as 
imperatives. Stig Kanger (1957/71) equated the valuation2 for imperative 
sentence !F and the valuation for deontic statement OughtF. Opposing attitudes 
are less common. Peter Geach (1958) argued that “moral utterances” and 
imperatives “have essentially different logical features: in particular, as regards 
negation” (p. 49).  
It seems that we can distinguish two matching imperative-deontic pairs. On 
one side, imperative as commanded action matches ought to be done deontic 
logic, while, on the other side, the notion of imperatives as a special kind of 
future tensed utterances complies with ought to be deontic logic. It may well be 
that “different logical features” of which Geach spoke pertain to the members of 
different pairs. For example, one should not expect to find a parallelism between 
ought to be done logic and imperative obligations and imperative permissions in 
the Chellas’ (1971) style3. As regards von Wright’s problem quoted above, the 
first imperative-deontic pair, or it shall be the case-ought to be pair is obviously 
not suitable for explaining the possibility of different deontic status of two 
actions resulting in mutually exclusive situations.  
In order to examine the consistency of ‘Obligatory(¬A/A)∧Forbidden(A/A)’ 
following the proposed route, i.e. from imperative to deontic logic, one should 
take into consideration the second, do!-ought to be done pair. In the forthcoming 
sections, we shall examine Lemmon’s (1965) imperative logic and its deontic 
extension given by Åqvist (1966). It is our opinion that the examination will 
provide the reasons for a semantics that is not “in the world”, i.e. the reasons for 
the semantics that cannot be reduced to a valuation at a particular point.  
                                                 
2 T(r,V,!F) = T(r,V,OughtF); T(r,V,OughtF) = 1 if and only if T(r′,V,OughtF) = 1 for each 
r′.such that ROught(r′,r), where r and r′ are “non-empty classes of individuals”, V is “primary 
valuation” which delivers an interpretation for non-logical symbols for each r, and T is 
“secondary valuation” 
3 Chellas defines imperative obligation as follows: ||!ϕ||(w, t) = 1 iff  ||ϕ||(w′, t) = 1 for every 
w′ such that Rt(w, w′); imperative permission: ||¡ϕ||(w, t) = 1 iff  ||ϕ||(w′, t) = 1 for some w′ 
such that Rt(w, w′).  
Commanded changes and orders being in force 
In Lemmon’s (1965) analysis imperatives are a kind of change expressions4. 
Change expression is an “expression of the form (A/B) where A and B are truth 
functional expressions” (p. 59). Semantics of imperatives may be given in terms 
of obedience and disobedience conditions: an imperative !(A/B) is obeyed if and 
only if the change from A to B takes place. 
 
Two negative 
imperatives 
~!(A/B) 
First Next Change 
expression 
“Positive” 
imperative 
N1 N2 
A B (A/B) !(A/B) !(A/~B) !~(A/B) 
   O D D 
   D O O 
   D D O 
   D D O 
‘O’ stands for ‘obeyed’ 
‘D’ stands for ‘disobeyed’ 
 
Lemmon (1965) further developed the semantics of imperatives using the 
notion of an order being in force. In his opinion, the common ground between 
imperative and deontic logic is to be sought for within the logic of orders being 
in force rather than within the logic of imperatives.  
Notation ‘O!(A/B)’ stands for ‘the order to effect change (A/B) is in force’. 
Lemmon’s exposition on the notion is very condensed and it is explicated only 
in syntactic terms. The meaning of the notion is given by the axiom schema (O4) 
and the rule of inference (RO2). Axiom schema (O4) O(S→C) ⊃ (O!S ⊃ OC) is 
to be read as “if one is ordered to do C in case of change S, then if one is ordered 
to effect S one is implicitly under orders to do C” (p.61). The rule of inference is 
“(RO2) from S ⊃ T to derive O!S ⊃ O!T” (p. 62), where ‘S’ and ‘T’ stand for 
arbitrary change expressions.  
Application of the order being in force logic on the von Wright’s problem of 
different deontic status shows that it is possible for two orders !(~A/A) and 
!(A/~A) to be simultaneously in force. Alas, the price is too high. In that case 
every order is in force.  
 
                                                 
4 The notation that is used in this paper always follows the notation used in the papers that are 
being referred to. 
(1) O!(~A/A)      premise 
(2) O!(A/~A)      premise 
(3) (~A/A) ⊃ ((A/~A) ⊃ ((~A/A)&(A/~A))) tautology 
(4) O!(~A/A) ⊃ O!((A/~A) ⊃ ((~A/A)&(A/~A))) (3), rule RO2 
(5) O!((A/~A) ⊃ ((~A/A)&(A/~A)))   (1), (4), modus 
ponens 
(6*) O((A/~A) → !((~A/A)&(A/~A)))  (5) definition for 
imperative conditional5 
(7) O((A/~A) → !((~A/A)&(A/~A))) ⊃ (O!(A/~A) ⊃ 
O!((~A/A)&(A/~A)))     axiom O4 
(8) O!(A/~A) ⊃ O!((~A/A)&(A/~A))   (6),(7), modus 
ponens 
(9) O!((~A/A)&(A/~A))     (2),(8), modus 
ponens 
(10) ((~A/A)&(A/~A)) ⊃ (~A/A&~A)  change logic 
(11) O!((~A/A)&(A/~A)) ⊃ O!(~A/A&~A)  (10), rule RO2 
(12) O!(~A/A&~A)     (9), (11), modus 
ponens 
(13) (~A/A&~A)⊃(C/D)     change logic 
(14) O!(~A/A&~A)⊃O!(C/D)    (13), rule RO2 
(15) O!(C/D)      (12), (14), modus 
ponens 
Lemmon (1965) wanted to reconsider “the soundness of […] deontic 
principles when interpreted as concerning orders”.  If one follows the line of 
thought, s/he must conclude that the notion of order being in force does not 
correspond to the notion of deontic status of an action. One may easily agree 
with the theorem (O!(~A/A)&O!(A/~A)) ⊃ O!(C/D): if the order to effect 
change (~A/A) is in force and the order to effect change (A/~A) is in force, then 
every order is in force. On the other hand, it does not seem valid to infer that 
every action is obligatory given that it is forbidden to effect change (A/A) and 
that it is obligatory to effect change (~A/A).  
                                                 
5 It may be questioned whether step (6) is really licensed in Lemmon’s system. In the system, 
the symbol ‘→’ is used for the special case of conditional imperative, having indicative 
antecedent and imperative consequent, e.g. (A/B)→!(C/D). In all other conditional 
compounds, the symbol ‘⊃’ is used in the sense of material implication. One can doubt 
whether (A/B)→!(C/D) is equivalent to !(A/B)⊃!(C/D). The example on p.63 confirms the 
equivalence: “…[order O((p/p)→!(q/~q))] is equivalent to 
!((p/~p)∨(~p/p)∨(~p/~p)∨(q/~q))…” 
Tense and deontic operators 
Åqvist (1966) investigated four6  ways of rewriting imperative change 
expressions in deontic terms. For that purpose he introduced binary deontic 
operators Ox- (Fx-,  Px-) for formalization of It ought to be (it is forbidden, it is 
permitted) that A changes to B and he used unary modal operator O that may be 
applied on a change expression. In other words, It ought to be that A changes to 
B is formalized as Ox(A,B) and analysed using unary “obligation-connective” O.  
O1(A,B) =def O(A/B) 
O2(A,B) =def A∧O(/B) 
The difference between O1 and O2 pertains to the temporal location of A. In 
the first case A and subsequent B both lie within each ideal future. In the second 
case, A is true now and there is a future state in each ideal history followed by 
B. 
F1(A,B) =def O(~A/~B) 
F2(A,B) =def A∧O(/~B) 
Deontic unary connectives are usually conceived as inter-defineable: OA ≡ 
F~A ≡ ~P~A. On the other hand, Åqvist’s (1966) analysis clearly shows that 
binary deontic operators are not interdefineable in that way.  
P1(A,B) =def ~O~(A/B) where ~(A/B) ≡ ((A/~B)∨(~A/B)∨(~A/~B)) 
P2(A,B) =def A∧~O~(/B), i.e. A∧~O(/~B), 
F3(A,B) =def O((A/~B)∨(~A/B)∨(~A/~B)) 
F4(A,B) =def ~A∨O~(/~B)), i.e. ~A∨O(/B)) 
The duality of O and F is not disputable: both O1(A,B) ≡ F1(~A,~B) and 
O2(A,B) ≡ F2(~A,~B) are valid. On the other side, P1 cannot be 
straightforwardly defined in terms of F1 or O1. The definition of P1(A,B) cannot 
be given as ~O1~(A,B) or  ~F1~(~A,~B) since the latter two expressions are not 
well-formed. If one uses ~PA for defining FA or O~A, one is thrown out of any 
of the two triads, O1-F1-P1 and O2-F2-P2. So, ~P1(A/B) and ~P2(A,B) are not 
expressible in terms of F1 and F2, respectively.  
                                                 
6 In deontic tense logic DDT (Åqvist, 1966) sentences are evaluated on a «DDT-system». 
Sentence /A is true at the instant i and history h iff A is true at the successor i' lying on h. 
Sentence OA is evaluated at the instant i and the set histories, I  that are ideal relative to i: OA 
is true at i iff A is true at each successor of i lying on any history that is ideal relative to i. The 
difference of O/A from /OA amounts to this: «O/A speaks of what takes place at the next 
stage in a course of events supposed to be ideal relative to [the evaluation point]; whereas 
/OA speaks of what takes place at the first stage of the course of events which is ideal 
relative to the next stage in the actual course of events», p.247. 
~P1(A,B) ≡ F3(A,B) 
~P2(A,B) ≡ F4(A,B) 
i1
i31
i32i21
i22 i33
~A
B
~BA
Full lines mark the histories that are ideal relative to i1. Dotted lines mark non-
ideal ones. At the evaluation point i1 only F3(A,B) is true; F1(A,B), F2(A,B), and 
F4(A,B) are all false. 
Negative and positive imperatives 
Let us pay attention to natural language imperatives. On the side of syntax, 
the general Lemmon change form, (A/B) may be restricted to the two forms. The 
change expressions that may occur in natural language imperative mood are 
limited to two elementary forms: symmetric, !(A/A) imperative form and 
complementary imperative form, !(¬A/A), both of which use the same base 
propositions. On the side of semantics, change expressions take two temporally 
located points of valuation: the initial and a resulting situation. In its 
informational part an imperative gives a description of the initial situation. The 
initial situation may be present or it may lie in the future. For example, in ‘Go to 
a grocery store tomorrow!’ we find a description of an initial future situation. 
The resulting situation always lies in the future, it is later than the initial 
situation, and it has a volitive or appetitive direction of fit (it is the resulting 
situation that should fit the imperative description and not vice versa). 
In the next sections we shall try to apply the analysis of natural language 
imperatives partly following the style of Åqvist (1966) paper. A “one shot” 
semantics with two sets of valuation points will be chosen. The first evaluation 
point will check the left side of a change expression, the second evaluation point 
will check the right side, the shall  part. In that way, the correspondent for 
O(A/) will be O*(/A). For example, in evaluating ‘(A/)∧O*(B/C)’ the 
valuation points for ‘A’ and ‘B’ will coincide and they will differ from the 
valuation point for ‘C’. 
The translation of natural language imperatives into a language of deontic 
terms should preserve the meaning relations between positive and negative 
imperatives. Positive and negative imperatives in natural language are equal in 
their binding force and informational layers. Negative imperative imposes 
obligation in the same way the positive imperative does. ‘Do not open the door!’ 
imposes obligation to keep the door closed in the way similar to the way in 
which ‘Open the door!’ imposes the obligation to open it. Negative and positive 
imperative take the same initial situation type but impose contradictory resulting 
states. The Oi-Fi definitions will be modified in order to establish a 
correspondence with the concept of negative imperative. 
The negation rule (Lemmon’s N1 negation type): 
¬!(¬A/A) ⇔ !(¬A/¬A) 
¬!(A/A) ⇔ !(A/¬A) 
Modified translations: 
O1*(A,B) =def (¬A/)∨O*(/B) 
F1*(A,B) =def (¬A/)∨O*(/¬B) 
O2*(A,B) =def O*(A/B) 
F2*(A,B) =def O*(A/¬B) 
O*(A/B) =def (A/)∧O*(/B) 
Imperative conditional combines an imperative and an indicative sentence. 
The time of eventual occurrence of the situation described in the indicative part 
coincides with the time of the eventual occurrence of the initial situation 
described by the left side of the imperative change expression. For example: let 
‘P’ stand for ‘the window is closed’ and ‘Q’ for ‘it is raining’. ‘Close the 
window if it is raining’ is formalized as ‘(Q/)→!(¬P/P)’. ‘Keep the window 
closed if it is raining’ is in the same fashion formalized as ‘(Q/)→!(P/P)’.  
 
The law of contraposition: 
!(¬A/A)→(B/)  ⇔  (¬B/)→¬!(¬A/A)  
⇔  (¬B/)→!(¬A/¬A) 
For example, under the proposed interpretation the conditional imperative 
‘Unless it rains do not open the window’ is equivalent to ‘Open the window only 
if it rains’. 
 
Deontic expressions Imperative expressions 
O1*(A,A) 
It is obligatory 
that A does not 
change to ¬A. 
F1*(A,¬A) 
It is forbidden that 
A changes to ¬A 
(A/)→!(A/A) 
Maintain A if A 
is the case. 
(A/)→¬!(A/¬A) 
Do not produce ¬A 
if  A is the case. 
O2*(¬A,A) 
It is the case that 
¬A and it is 
obligatory that A 
(will be).. 
F2*(¬A,¬A) 
It is the case that 
¬A and it is 
forbidden that ¬A 
(will be).. 
!(¬A/A) 
Produce A! 
¬!(¬A/¬A) 
Do not preserve ¬A!
Two examples for translations (in the rows). 
 
Investigation by cases will not reveal the fact the two actions, producing P 
and preventing P, may “have different deontic status”.  
Case 1.  O1*- (F1*-) translation. 
(1) O1*(¬P,P)∧F1*(P,P)    deontic premise 
(2) ((¬P/)→O*(/P))∧((P/)→O*(/¬P)) (1), O1*/F1* definitions 
(3) O*(/P)∨O*(/¬P)    (3), propositional logic 
Case 2. O2*- (F2*-) translation..  
(1) O2*(¬P,P)∧F2*(P,P)    deontic premise 
(2) ((¬P/)∧O*(/P))∧((P/)∧O*(/¬P)) (1), O2*/F2* translations 
(3) ⊥       (2), change logic 
In local, or “truth at the point” semantics von Wright’s problem cannot be 
solved. In the first case, O1*(¬P,P)∧F1*(P,P) is satisfiable. Nevertheless, what 
we need is O*(/P)∧O*(/¬P), and that is not satisfiable. In the second case, 
O2*(¬P,P)∧F2*(P,P) is not satisfiable. In order to explain von Wright’s example 
(i.e. to show that ‘Obligatory(¬P/P)∧Forbidden(P/P)’ is consistent) one must 
turn to a different semantics. 
 
Global semantics and opposite actions 
Let us investigate an action deontic status within a simple global semantics 
that relies on some intuitive relations between the expressions: ‘obligatory’, 
‘forbidden’ and ‘permitted’. The formal model <W,W*,Π> is intended to model 
a cognitive-motivational state of an addressee with respect to the changes that 
s/he ought (ought not) to perform. Alternatively, we will use the term ‘obligation 
pattern’ for a cognitive motivational state. 
W is the set of valuations indexed by the time t 
W* is the set of valuations indexed by the time t* which is later 
than t  
Π⊆ W×W*, the set of permitted performable changes 
Intension of a sentence A of propositional logic given a set of valuations X is 
a subset of X: 
|A|X  = {w: w∈X and w(A) = } 
Intension of a change expression (A/B) is an action: 
||A/B ||W×W* = {<w,v>:w∈W, v∈W*, w∈|A|W and v∈|B|W*} 
An action ||(A/B)||W×W* is performable from an agent’s perspective only if  
s/he does not believe that ¬A is (will be) the case in the initial situation. If an 
agent knows that ¬A is the case in the initial situation, then s/he considers it to 
be impossible to perform an action that will make a change (A/B) come true. In 
the realm of uncertainty when an agent does not know whether A or ¬A is the 
case in the initial situation, both (A/B) and (¬A/B) may be (doxastically) 
performable actions. 
Opposite action: 
OPPOSITE(||A/B ||W×W*) = ||A/¬B ||W×W* 
The notion of opposite action resembles the notion of negative imperative. 
For positive imperative-negative imperative pair and for action-opposite action 
pair the descriptions of initial situations coincide, while the descriptions of the 
resulting situations disagree. 
Produce action 
||P/P||W×W* 
Complement action 
||/||W×W* − ||P/P||W×W* 
Opposite action 
||P/¬P||W×W* 
Keeping the window closed   
Opening the window Opening the window 
Closing the window 
 
Keeping the window open 
 
W and W* have all the valuations. 
In defining semantic conditions we will use the notion of ‘a formula being 
required by the model’. In that way we want to emphasize the fact that a 
valuation by the inclusion in the set of performable permitted actions will be 
used instead of valuation at a point  
Obligatory action: 
Model <W,W*,Π> requires O*(X) if and only if ||X|| ⊆ Π and 
OPPOSITE(||X||) ∩ Π = ∅ 
Permitted action: 
Model <W,W*,Π> requires P*(X)  if and only if ||X|| ∩ Π ≠ ∅ 
Forbidden action: 
F*(A/B) ⇔ O*(A/¬B) 
The main definitions rely on the meaning relations between ‘obligatory’, 
‘forbidden’ and ‘permitted’. Interdefinability is preserved due to the fact that in 
a sense obligatory action is defined as the one which is permitted and whose 
opposite action is not permitted.  
W×W*Π
XX Opposite(X) Opposite(X) 
YY
ZZ
Opposite(Z)
Opposite(Y)
 
Deontic status of a generic action depends on the “location” of its opposite. 
Action X is obligatory and opposite of X is forbidden. Neither action Y nor 
opposite of Y are obligatory. Neither action Z nor opposite of Z are forbidden. 
 
We shall formulate some principles that are sound with the respect to the 
given semantics. 
Expansion principles:  
(PE) If an action is obligatory, then any act that realizes it is permitted. 
O*(A/B) ⇒ P*(A/B∧C), where ¬C is not the consequence of B: 
(NE) If an action is obligatory, then no act failing to realize it is permitted. 
O*(A/B) ⇒ ¬P*(A/¬B∧C) 
Using the two principles it can be proved that two actions equivalent with the 
respect to the initial situation and leading to logically independent states of 
affairs cannot be both obligatory.  
¬(O*(A/B)∧O*(A/C)), where ¬C is not the consequence of B 
Proof (reductio ad absurdum). Suppose that O*(A/B)∧O*(A/C) 
holds. Then by propositional logic both O*(A/B) and O*(A/C) 
must hold. By (PE) expansion principle O*(A/B) implies 
P*(A/B∧¬C). By (NE) expansion principle O(A/C) implies 
¬P*(A/B∧¬C). Contradiction. Therefore, ¬(O*(A/B)∧O*(A/C)). 
Using these definitions one can accommodate von Wright’s example. It is 
consistent to assert that an agent may be obliged to open the closed window and 
s/he may be obliged to close the opened window. The two actions may have 
different deontic status. So, O*(¬P/P)∧O*(P/¬P), or O*(¬P/P)∧F*(P/P) may 
define a consistent obligation pattern for an agent, but only under condition that 
s/he does not know which situation is actual. In order to prove that fact we shall 
introduce two types of sentences that can be used to describe the belief side of a 
cognitive motivational state. The initial situation sentence can be required by a 
model only if there is a description shared by all initial situations for any 
obligatory action. If there is no common feature in all initial situations, then the 
obligation pattern lacks information on the initial situation and the strongest 
initial situation sentence that can be used to characterize it is a “might-sentence”. 
Initial state sentence: 
Model <W,W*,Π> requires (A/) iff Π ⊆ ||(A/)|| 
Might sentence: 
Model <W,W*,Π> requires Might(A/) iff ||(A/)|| ∩ Π ≠ ∅ 
Doxastic import of obligatory action: 
O*(A/B) ⇒ Might(A/) 
Doxastic implications of von Wright’s example: 
O*(¬P/P)∧O*(P/¬P) ⇒ ¬(P/) 
O*(¬P/P)∧O*(P/¬P) ⇒ Might(P/)∧Might(¬P/) 
W×W*Π
||P/¬P||||P/¬P|| ||P/P||||P/P||
||¬P/P||||¬P/P|| ||¬P/¬P||||¬P/¬P||
 
Von Wright's example:  
O(¬P/P)∧F(P/P) ⇔ O(¬P/P)∧O(P/¬P) 
The simplest model for it: 
<W,W*,Π> requires O(¬P/P)∧F(P/P) 
W={w1,w2}, W*={w*1,w*2}, where w1(P) = w*1(P) =  and w2(P) = w*2(P) = ⊥; 
Π = {<w2,w*1>,<w1,w*2>};  
||¬P/P||W×W* = {<w2,w*1>}; OPPOSITE(||¬P/P||W×W*) = ||¬P/¬P||W×W* = 
{<w2,w*2>}; ||P/¬P||W×W* = {<w1,w*2>}; OPPOSITE(||P/¬P||W×W*) = ||P/P||W×W* 
= {<w1 ,w*1>} 
Within an obligation pattern in which two generic actions, one resulting in P 
and the other resulting in ¬P are both obligatory it seems that another obligation 
arises; namely, the “epistemic obligation”. In the absence of any information on 
the initial state the addressee should find out whether P is the case. The 
correspondence between imperative and deontic expressions that is argued for in 
this article can be briefly expressed as follows: imperatives create an obligation 
pattern that can be described in deontic terms. 
It seems that Ǻqvist’s (1975) analysis of interrogatives could be employed 
here to open further topics for investigation. He formalized questions in terms of 
two different modal operators: imperative operator and epistemic operator. For 
example, ‘Is the window closed?’ can be interpreted as ‘Let it (turn out) to be 
the case that either I know that the window is closed or I know that the window 
is not closed’. Following the idea that imperatives create an obligation pattern, 
one could say that (given a suitable social relation) a question obliges the Hearer 
to a specific action, namely the one resulting situation is defined in terms of 
Speaker’s epistemic state. 
On the other hand, in von Wright’s example one should reverse the 
connection between epistemic imperative (interrogative) and deontic logic. By 
uttering the two conditional commands, ‘Close the window if it is open, and if it 
is closed, open it’ the Speaker creates an obligation pattern in which the action 
of closing the window is obligatory and the action of keeping the window closed 
is forbidden (i.e. the action of opening the window is obligatory). Such an 
obligation pattern may persist only in the absence of information on the initial 
state. There is an action that the Hearer ought to perform but it is impossible to 
perform both. The ignorant Hearer can satisfy the obligation pattern only by 
finding out which action is really (and not only doxastically) performable. So, an 
epistemic obligation arises for the Hearer. 
One suggestion would be to may introduce a new composite, epistemic 
obligation operator OE. The epistemic operator OE(A/) says that there is 
obligation to find out whether A is the case. The obligation OE(A/) is required 
by the given cognitive-motivational state (i) it is not settled whether A is (will 
be) the case in the initial situation, and (ii) there is an obligatory action triggered 
by an initial situation in which A holds or there is an obligatory action triggered 
by an initial situation in which ¬A holds. 
Model <W,W*,Π> requires OE(A/) iff  
(i) ||(A/)|| ∩ Π ≠ ∅ and ||(¬A/)|| ∩ Π ≠ ∅, 
and  
(ii) OPPOSITE(||(A/)|| ∩ Π) ∩ Π = ∅ or OPPOSITE(||(¬A/)|| ∩ 
Π) ∩ Π = ∅ 
Some principles are obvious:  
OE(A/) ⇔ OE(¬A/) 
OE(A/) ⇒ Might(A/)∧Might(¬A/) 
OE(A/) ⇒ ¬O*(/) 
Epistemic obligation and Von Wright’s example: 
O*(¬P/P)∧O*(P/¬P) ⇒ OE(P/) 
 
 
From imperatives to obligations 
Here is how master shifts the boundary. From time to time he says to the slave 
that such-and-such courses of action are impermissible. Any such statement 
depends for its truth value on the boundary between what is permissible and what 
isn’t. But if the master says that something is impermissible, and if that would be 
false if the boundary remained stationary, then straightway the boundary moves 
inward. The permissible range contracts so that what the master says is true after 
all. Thereby the master makes courses of action impermissible that used to be 
permissible. (Lewis, 1979, p. 340) 
In this section we will try provide a sketch of a system of formal semantics 
that can explicate the way in which imperative sentences can shift the boundary 
between permissible and impermissible. The system will be restricted to “inward 
shift”. Permissible range can contract but it cannot be expanded; no imperative 
can be derogated. Using the terminology of the preceding sections; we will try to 
describe a way which natural language sentences could create an obligation 
pattern. The main idea is that a sentence can bring about some change in the 
cognitive motivational state of a hearer. Going back to Lewis’ quotation, the 
master utters sentences and changes cognitive motivational state of the slave and 
eventually controls his behavior in that way.  
In giving (functional) dynamic semantics7 one has to specify a language, a set 
of states, and an interpretation function, which takes a sentence and a state as 
input and delivers a state as output.  
The language LN that will be considered is intended to formalize natural 
language imperatives. For that reason, the syntax will be restricted. An atomic 
sentence of natural language imperative logic is composed out of one modal 
element and one sentence radical8. There are three modal elements in the 
language under consideration: one imperative modal element, ‘!’ and two 
indicative modal elements,‘•’ for ‘it is the case in the initial situation that…’ and 
‘•N’ for ‘given the laws of the nature it is inevitable that …’. Sentence radicals in 
the language LN are change expressions meeting the following restriction: 
change expression (A/B) is a sentence radical in LN  if and only if A⇔B or 
A⇔¬B or A⇔ or B⇔. If A/B and C/D are sentence radicals in LN , then 
!(A/B), •(A/B), •N(A/B), ¬!(A/B), ¬•(A/B), !(A/B)→•(C/D), •(A/B)→!(C/D), 
are sentences in LN. 
                                                 
7 Here developed formal semantics is a variant of “update semantics” of Veltman, 1996. The 
simple update system is basically a “one move” system with basic instruction X[ϕ] = |ϕ|X, 
where |ϕ|X  is a set of valuations verifying ϕ in the standard sense.  
8 The terminology is derived from Stenius (1967). 
Set of (slave's) cognitive-motivational states: Σ={<W,W*,Π>: W⊆I, W*⊆R, 
Π ⊆ W×W*}. W, W* and Π are defined as in the preceding section and I and R 
are sets containing all valuations for the propositional letters in the language 
under consideration indexed by the instants in which initial and resulting 
situation may occur. The subset F={<W,W*,Π>: W = ∅ or W* = ∅ or Π = ∅} 
and in particular its element 1 = <∅,∅,∅> should be distinguished in order to 
define semantic notions. Since the notions of dynamic consequence will not be 
discussed here9, we will use state 1 only as an indication that a contraction of 
permissible range has failed. Also we need the special state (“nothing believed, 
everything permitted”) 0 = <I,R,I×R> to be the element in Σ. 
In order to define the meaning of the sentences, conceived as their “potential” 
for changing states, we will use the notion of intension defined in the same way 
as in the preceding section. Intension of a sentence A of propositional logic 
given a set of valuations X is a subset of X: |A|X = {w: w∈X and w(A) = }. 
Intension of a sentence radical (A/B) is a subset of W×W*: ||(A/B)||W×W*= 
{<w,v>:w∈W, v∈W, w∈|A|W and v∈|B|W*}.  
Imperative:  
<W,W*,Π>[!(A/B)] = <W,W*,||(A/B)||Π> if |B|W* ≠ W* 
<W,W*,Π>[!(A/B)] = 1 if |B|W* = W* 
Initial situation indicative: 
<W,W*,Π>[•(A/)] = <W,W*,||(A/)||Π> 
Inevitable situation indicative: 
<W,W*,Π>[•N(A/A)] = <|A|W,|A|W*,||(A/A)||Π> 
Conditional imperative: 
(i) <W,W*,Π>[•(A/)→!(B/C)] = <W,W*,Π>[!(B/C)] if 
<W,W*,Π>[•A] = <W,W*,Π> 
(ii) <W,W*,Π>[•(A/)→!(B/C)] = 
<W,W*,||(A∧B/C)||Π∪||(¬A∧B/)||Π> if <W,W*,Π>[•(A/)] ≠ 
<W,W*,Π> 
Negation of initial situation indicative:  
¬•(B/) ⇔ •(¬B/) 
Negation of imperative 
¬!(A/A) ⇔ !(A/¬A) 
                                                 
9 An elaborate formal analysis of dynamic semantics is given in van Benthem, 1996. 
Using the definitions one can easily prove some intuitive meaning relations. 
The equivalence between “result-oriented”, shall-imperative and conditional 
imperatives is an interesting example of the natural language workings. ‘Make 
sure that A’ is equivalent to ‘Produce A if ¬A is the case, and maintain A if A is 
the case’. 
!(/A) ⇔ (•(A/)→!(A/A))∧(•(¬A/)→!(¬A/A)) 
It may be asked how it is possible to command a complex change using 
limited resources, i.e. two elementary imperative forms. For example, 
!(¬A∧B/A∧B) is neither a produce (complementary) nor a maintain (symmetric) 
imperative. Nevertheless, the sequence !(¬A/A);!(B/B) produces the same 
effect10. 
Let us turn our attention to von Wright’s problem again. By uttering the two 
conditional commands, ((¬P/)→!(¬P/P))∧((P/)→!(P/¬P)) the master may 
make the two generic actions obligatory for the slave. Let the symbolic 
expression ‘<S>{O}’ stand for ‘there is a cognitive motivational state created by 
utterance S that requires obligation pattern O’.  
<((¬P/)→!(¬P/P))∧((P/)→!(P/¬P))> {O*(¬P/P)∧O*(P/¬P)} 
Or, to put it another formalism in which σ[ϕ] denotes the result of changing 
the model σ∈Σ by the sentence ϕ ∈ LN : 
∃σ: σ[(¬P/)→!(¬P/P); ((P/)→!(P/¬P)] requires 
O*(¬P/P)∧O*(P/¬P) 
¬∃σ: σ[(¬P/)→!(¬P/P); ((¬P/)→!(¬P/¬P)] requires 
O*(¬P/P)∧O*(¬P/¬P) 
The second assertion shows that there is limit to the master’s power. There is 
nothing that the master could say to make the opposite actions obligatory.  
                                                 
10 The translation of the full change expressions language into language LN  restricted to the 
two imperative forms can be constructed as follows. Let (X/Y) be any change expression: 
!(X/Y) is equivalent to •(X/)∧!(/Y), and !(/Y) is equivalent to 
(•(Y/)→!(Y/Y))∧(•(¬Y/)→!(¬Y/Y)) 
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